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7. Moving Towards a Dissolved or 
Strengthened Union? 
Arjan H. Schakel 
 
The Scottish National Party (SNP) stated in its manifesto for 
the May 2016 Scottish Parliament election that it would 
consider holding a second independence referendum if there 
was a material change of circumstances, such as the UK 
leaving the EU. A slight majority (51.9 per cent) voted in 
favour of leaving the European Union (EU) but in Scotland a 
clear majority (62.0 per cent) wants to remain in the EU. Since 
then there is an intensive political debate and negotiation 
about the relations between Scotland and the rest of the 
United Kingdom and the European Union. What is the likely 
outcome of this debate? Is Scotland wandering on the path of 
secession? 
In contrast to what many people would think, I will argue that 
a strengthened Union is a more likely scenario than a 
dissolved Union. Such a counterintuitive conclusion is based 
on an assessment of the causal drivers of devolution in the 
UK. Therefore, I will explore whether external (European 
integration) or internal (nationalist parties) pressures are 
driving Scottish nationalism. I will put Scotland’s autonomy 
arrangement in a comparative perspective to see if further 
decentralisation would be possible and what it could look like. 
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It appears that Scotland has many self-rule powers but shared 
rule with England and the other devolved administrations is 
underdeveloped. My analysis suggests that Scottish 
independence is unlikely to happen. Rather, more 
devolution, involving a development of shared rule, will 
strengthen the Union with England.  
 
European Integration and Regionalism 
European integration is often portrayed as a story of Member 
States pooling their authority to collaboratively decide and 
implement policy. But there is another story to European 
integration: a widening and deepening Europe coincides with 
a trend of increasing regionalism. This was already observed 
in the early 1990s by Gary Marks (1992), who studied the 
reforms of the European Community’s structural funds policy 
in the course of the Maastricht Treaty. A state-level approach 
could neither satisfactorily explain why there had been 
fundamental innovations in the administration of structural 
funds nor account for the considerable growth of funding. 
Subnational governments had become increasingly 
important for implementing EU policy most notably cohesion 
policy and structural funds (Marks 1993, 392). The 
involvement of regions in European structural policy went 
along with calls for more regional authority (Jones and 
Keating 1995; Jeffery 1997), and with the creation of the 
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Single European Market regions became less economically 
reliant on domestic markets. Some scholars postulated a 
vision of a ‘Europe of the regions’, or more modestly, a 
‘Europe with the regions’ in which power was devolved 
upwards to the European level or downwards to the regional 
tier (Piattoni, 2009). 
What is the nature of European integration and regionalism 
in the UK? To what extent can devolution in the UK be related 
to the process of European integration?  
The Regional Authority Index (RAI) (Hooghe et al. 2016) 
allows me to systematically trace trends in decentralisation 
of government authority across countries and time. The RAI 
breaks down regional authority into two dimensions. Self-rule 
is the power exercised by a regional government over citizens 
within its territory. For example, the German Länder have the 
competences to shape policy with regard to culture, 
education, universities and the police. Shared rule is the 
authority of a regional government co-exercised in the 
country as a whole. In Germany, shared rule takes two forms. 
The executive governments of the Länder appoint 
representatives in the Bundesrat, which is an upper chamber 
of parliament with veto powers over many federal laws. The 
Länder can also shape national policy and coordinate policies 
through Ministerkonferenzen in which ministers of the Länder 
meet with federal ministers.  
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The RAI provides autonomy scores for regional governments 
in 81 countries between 1950 and 2010. Figure 1 displays 
average RAI scores for four groups of countries showing that 
regional authority has increased over time. In the EU, in ‘west 
old democracies’ (i.e. Belgium, France, Germany, 
Netherlands) average regional authority increased slightly 
from ten in 1950 to almost sixteen in 2010. Regional authority 
also increased in countries which democratised (e.g. Greece, 
Portugal, Spain) and in countries anticipating EU 
membership (e.g. Hungary, Poland, Romania).  
 
Figure 1: Average regional authority index scores for four groups of 
countries between 1950 and 2010. 
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The rise of regional authority in EU countries suggests a 
causal link between European integration and 
decentralisation processes. However, regional authority has 
also increased in countries outside the EU. The average RAI 
score for OECD non-EU countries (e.g. Australia, Canada, 
New Zealand, US) increased from twelve points in 1950 to 15 
points in 2010. This indicates a global rather than a European-
specific decentralisation trend and raises the question for 
other causes of regionalism. The next section, therefore, 
looks into nationalist parties as drivers for decentralisation. 
What is the role of the SNP in Scotland and Plaid Cymru (PC) 
in Wales for devolution in the UK? 
 
Regionalist Parties and Regionalism 
Alongside a coinciding trend of European integration and 
decentralisation reforms, scholars have also noted a rise in 
nationalist (often also referred to as regionalist) parties, 
especially since the 1970s (De Winter et al. 2006; Matthias 
2006). The electoral development of regionalist parties – 
defined as parties which prioritise autonomy claims – is 
displayed in Figure 2. Clearly, these parties are on the rise in 
national and regional elections.  
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Figure 2: Average regionalist party strength in national and regional 
elections.  
Notes: Average regionalist party strength is derived by dividing the sum 
of regional vote shares for all regionalist parties by the total number of 
elections for each decade and the average includes elections where 
regionalist parties did not participate. 
Decentralisation is not only promoted by European 
integration but also by regionalist parties, as in the UK. This 
raises the question how European integration, 
decentralisation and regionalist parties are connected to 
each other.  
Regionalist parties can be distinguished between parties that 
challenge the unity of the state and want to become an 
108 
 
independent country (secessionist parties) and those who do 
not challenge the unity of state but seek more autonomy 
(autonomist parties). Both types of parties have seen their 
average vote share increasing but especially secessionist 
parties have been on the rise in the 2000s (Figure 2). Not only 
have regionalist parties become electorally stronger but also 
more radical. Previous research has shown that 
decentralisation reforms foster a radicalisation of regionalist 
parties. A change in RAI score from 1 to 20 increases the 
probability that a regionalist party is a secessionist party from 
10 per cent to 60 per cent (Massetti and Schakel 2013). Hence, 
it appears that European integration alone is not a likely 
driver for devolution in the UK but that electorally growing 
and ideologically radicalising regionalist parties are a more 
likely cause. 
 
European Integration, Regionalist Parties and a 
Dissolving United Kingdom 
In order to gain insight on the question whether European 
integration and/or regionalist parties are driving devolution, I 
look at regional variation in voting during the Brexit 
referendum and I track the electoral developments of the 
main regionalist parties in Scotland (SNP) and Wales (PC). In 
Wales, 52.5 per cent of the voters opted for Leave which is 
very close to the result in England (53.4 per cent). In Scotland, 
however, 62.0 per cent of the voters wanted to remain in the 
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EU. This result indicates that Scotland is far more Europhile 
than the rest of the UK (in Northern Ireland 55.8 per cent of 
the voters want to remain in the EU).  
The stark contrast in the referendum result has led to a 
discussion whether there should be a second referendum on 
Scottish independence. Public opinion towards the EU is used 
by the SNP as a legitimation to have a second independence 
referendum and in this way European integration may be 
indirectly furthering devolution in the UK. But it is clear that 
the impact of European integration is mediated by regionalist 
parties. This point is further illustrated by having a look at 
Wales where a clear majority of voters want to leave the EU. 
This is a surprising result considering that at a very 
conservative estimate Wales enjoys an annual net benefit of 
£245 million from the UK’s relationship with the EU. Richard 
Wyn Jones (2016) ascribes this remarkable result to a failure 
of Welsh politicians to inform voters about the benefits of EU 
membership.  
Wyn Jones’ explanation hints that the impact of European 
integration on devolution in the UK is most likely an indirect 
one and is mediated by regionalist parties which can use 
public opinion towards the EU as a legitimation for further 
decentralisation reforms. The extent to which regionalist 
parties do so will depend on whether they think they will 
electorally benefit from ‘exploiting’ the EU. This is far more 
likely for the SNP than for the PC because in Wales voters 
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tend to be more Eurosceptic. The SNP can benefit from 
emphasising European issues whereas PC cannot.  
From Table 1 one can observe that the electoral results for PC 
are quite stable over time, no matter whether PC is in regional 
government or not. In Scotland, however, the SNP has been 
on the rise and since 2011, when it formed a single-party 
government, it is the dominant party in Scotland. Thanks to 
a recent referendum on Scottish independence in 2014 and 
further helped by Brexit, decentralisation demands have 
intensified far more in Scotland than in Wales. However, in 
the case when the SNP manages to extract more authority 
from London, my argument is that a strengthened Union is 
more likely than a dissolved Union. 
Table 1: Electoral results for the Scottish National Party and Plaid Cymru. 
Notes: Shown are the electoral results for PC and SNP in Holyrood 
(Scottish Parliament), Cardiff (Welsh Assembly) and Westminster 
(Parliament of the United Kingdom) elections. 129 seats are at stake in 
Holyrood elections and 59 (72 for 1997-2001) seats are at stake in 
Westminster elections. 60 seats are at stake in Cardiff elections and 40 
seats are at stake in Westminster elections. Vote percentages for 
Westminster elections refer to the votes won in Scotland and Wales. 
Figures in bold indicate the elections when the regionalist party was 
forming regional executive government. 
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Scotland’s Autonomy Arrangement 
In order to substantiate my argument, I will first discuss 
Scotland’s autonomy arrangement in detail to identify the 
areas in which further devolution is likely. Three 
considerations are important for the question, whether the 
UK is moving towards a dissolved or strengthened Union. 
First, is a further decentralisation of authority possible for 
Scotland or does more devolution automatically entail 
secession? And if further decentralisation reforms are 
possible, in which areas? Second, devolution is essentially a 
bargaining process between regionalist and statewide parties 
and thereby the preferences of these parties are likely to 
inform possible decentralisation reforms. Third, once there is 
room for further decentralisation and the preferences of 
parties are favourable towards more devolution then the 
question pops-up what the new autonomy arrangement will 
look like?  
Starting with the first consideration, we can usefully employ 
the Regional Authority Index again. Scotland’s autonomy is 
far reaching (Table 2). The region has its own parliament 
which elects its own executive (representation) and which can 
make laws on a wide variety of policies except immigration 
(policy scope) without interference from central government 
(institutional depth). Further decentralisation on the self-rule 
dimension is conceivable, especially on the fiscal side. 
Scotland can set a rate on income tax (three pence in the 
pound) (tax autonomy) but has never used this power and 
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when the region would like to borrow it can only do so 
through national government (borrowing autonomy). 
Table 2: Scotland’s autonomy arrangement compared to maximum 
scores. 
Space for further devolution can be especially found on the 
shared rule side of the autonomy arrangement. Whereas 
Scotland has the institutional means to voice its opinion with 
regard to UK legislation in the region (law making) and has, in 
practice, a veto on its own constitutional status through the 
Sewel convention, it lacks powers on executive and fiscal 
matters. Intergovernmental meetings between London and 
Edinburgh are restricted to non-binding bilateral and inter-
departmental concordats and pacts, and Scotland has 
virtually no say or powers to alter the Barnett formula which 
regulates the unconditional fiscal grant from the UK to 
Scottish government. In sum, future decentralisation reforms 
are likely to include fiscal reforms and most ‘gains’ can be 
achieved with regard to shared rule. 
The SNP realises that Scotland is lacking competences in 
raising taxes and in citizenship and immigration and states 
that it would like to have competences over these policies 
113 
 
(SNP 2013). None of the three main statewide parties are in 
favour of an independent Scotland but they do support 
further devolution to Scotland, in particular with regard to 
income tax and welfare (attendance allowances, housing 
benefits and supplements) (Conservatives 2014; Labour 
2014; Liberal Democrats 2014). Given the convergence 
between the preferences of the SNP on one side and the 
three major statewide parties on the other side, it is not 
surprising that the Scotland Act 2016 gives Scotland the 
power to set income tax rates and bands and the right to 
receive half of the revenues of value added taxes raised in 
Scotland. In addition, the Scotland Act 2016 extends the 
powers over employment support and universal credit, and 
Scotland can now top-up cuts to tax credits specified in 
Westminster legislation. In other words, the space for 
increased autonomy on self-rule has been filled up with the 
latest Scotland Act of 2016 with the exception of immigration 
and citizenship. Hence, more self-rule is hardly conceivable 
unless Scotland, indeed, secedes.  
This is something the SNP does not want despite the fact that 
they use the word ‘independence’ constantly. In the 
document Scotland’s Future, the SNP clearly outlines that it 
wants to keep five Unions. The party does not want to leave 
the EU, wants to remain in NATO, wants to keep the Pound 
Sterling and the monarchy, and wants to keep up a social 
union with the rest of the UK (SNP 2013). What the SNP 
envisages as independence can be better described by ‘full 
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autonomy’ or ‘autonomy to the maximum’ rather than 
secession because keeping the Pound, the monarchy and the 
welfare state of the UK necessarily implies remaining part of 
the Union.  
The need for intergovernmental meetings is acknowledged 
by the three statewide parties. The Conservatives would like 
to have a ‘Committee of all the Parliaments and Assemblies 
of the United Kingdom’ which ‘should be created to consider 
the developing role of the United Kingdom, its Parliaments 
and Assemblies and their respective powers, representation 
and financing’ (Conservatives 2014). This comes very close to 
what the Liberal Democrats (2014) suggest: ‘The Secretary of 
State for Scotland should convene a meeting after the 
referendum, within thirty days, where parties and wider 
interests can meet. Its aim should be to secure a consensus 
for the further extension of powers to the Scottish 
Parliament’. More formalised intergovernmental meetings 
are proposed by the Labour Party (2014, 5) which envisages 
‘Partnership arrangements between Parliaments and 
Governments whose responsibilities will inevitably overlap 
should be established, so that they work together for the 
common good, safeguarding civil and political rights, and 
promoting social and economic rights such as welfare and full 
employment. There is a strong case for giving partnership 
arrangements a legal existence, in the form of statutory 
obligations on both administrations to co-operate in the public 
interest, or through the creation of a formal Intergovernmental 
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Council or its equivalent with the duty to hold regular meetings’ 
(emphasis added).  
The need for cooperation between the UK governments is 
also acknowledged by the SNP but the party does use the 
‘lingo’ normally reserved for international relations between 
countries: 
With our immediate neighbours in the British Isles and 
Northern Europe, independence will create opportunities for 
co-operation, with future governments able to engage as 
equals in partnerships that enhance Scotland’s position in 
relation to important policy areas including energy, tourism, 
security and culture. (SNP 2013, 212) 
Independence will allow Scotland and the rest of the UK to 
work together on matters of common interest, as nations do 
across the world. This will include current cross-border 
arrangements on health treatments, combating serious and 
organised crime and terrorism and administrative 
arrangements to deliver services to the people of Scotland 
and the rest of the UK when this makes sense (ibid., 216; 
emphasis added). 
Scotland’s most important diplomatic relationships will be 
with the rest of the UK and Ireland, reflecting cultural history 
and family ties, shared interests in trade, security and 
common travel. The current Scottish Government plans a 
substantial diplomatic presence in both London and Dublin 
and will be active participants in the British-Irish Council, the 
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secretariat of which is already based in Edinburgh (ibid; 
emphasis added). 
In sum, party preferences converge on the need for 
intergovernmental meetings to coordinate policy but they 
remain silent on how these intergovernmental relations 
should look like, which form it should take and which policies 
it should cover. The Scotland Act 2016 is almost exclusively 
concerned with self-rule powers whilst shared rule is not 
addressed. Any further devolution is, therefore, most likely to 
involve intergovernmental meetings. The discussion on self-
rule already revealed that dissolution is not likely to happen 
because, in the end, the SNP wants to keep the monetary, 
monarchic, and social Union with the rest of the UK. Further 
decentralisation is conceivable with regard to shared rule but 
will these kind of reforms strengthen or weaken the Union(s)? 
 
Scenarios for Scotland’s Autonomy Arrangement 
Scotland is an autonomous region which means that it has its 
own and unique autonomy arrangement within a country. 
This is quite common for regions with electorally strong 
regionalist parties. In Table 3, the Scottish shared rule 
arrangement is compared to those of its peers, that is other 
special autonomous regions in Europe. Basque Country, 
Catalonia, Aland and Faroe Islands score low for law making 
and constitutional reform, while Scotland has comparatively 
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high scores. In case of fiscal control, Bolzano-Bozen and Valle 
d’Aosta can also inform possible decentralisation reforms for 
Scotland. I will discuss each shared rule dimension in turn. 
Table 3: Scotland’s autonomy arrangement (shared rule) compared to 
other autonomous regions in Europe. 
With regard to national law making Scotland can veto 
Westminster laws through the Sewel convention which 
stipulates that the UK Parliament will not legislate with 
regard to devolved matters except with the agreement of the 
devolved legislature. According to the Sewel convention, 
three categories of provision are not enacted in primary 
legislation at Westminster unless the devolved assemblies 
give their consent: (1) provisions that would be within the 
legislative competence of the devolved executives; (2) 
provisions that would extend the executive competence of 
the devolved assemblies; and (3) provisions that would alter 
the legislative competence of the devolved assemblies. The 
Sewel convention effectively grants Scotland a veto on its 
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own autonomy arrangement and this is the maximum which 
can be achieved.  
Most autonomous regions, including Scotland, do not have a 
say in national and regional borrowing except for the Basque 
Country and Catalonia. These two regions exercise borrowing 
control through a multilateral council on fiscal policy and 
finance (Consejo de Política Fiscal y Financiera). However, this 
mix of multilateral and bilateral shared rule seems to be a 
Spanish exception. Borrowing control is conceivable for 
Scotland but in a multilateral rather than a bilateral format, 
which would require that the UK government regularly meets 
with the devolved governments to take binding decisions on 
government borrowing. 
All in all, it seems that most scope for further devolution is in 
executive control and fiscal control. What decentralisation 
reforms can be conceived in relation to executive control? This 
could involve upgrading to the Joint Ministerial Committees 
by regular meetings where formal and binding decisions are 
taken on a wide range of policies, and, when desired because 
of diverging regional interests, the devolved governments 
can decide to participate in binding legislation or not.1 
Scotland’s fiscal control arrangement stands in stark contrast 
with those for other autonomous regions (Table 3). Scotland 
receives most of its income through an unconditional grant 
from the UK government determined by the Barnett formula 
which gives the devolved administrations a proportionate 
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share of spending on comparable functions in England, given 
their populations compared to England. The Barnett formula 
falls under the complete purview of the Treasury. The 
devolved administrations are consulted on an ad hoc basis 
and in case of disagreement, the devolved administration, or 
Secretary of State can pursue the issue with the Treasury but 
the Treasury makes the decisions. Alternative fiscal control 
arrangements can be found in Bolzano-Bozen and Valle 
d’Aosta which are consulted on and in Aland and Faroe 
Islands which can negotiate the tax revenues allocated to 
their region. The Basque Country has a special fiscal 
agreement (Concierto) with the central government whereby 
the region administers and collects taxes and pays a 
contribution (cupo) to the central government for the services 
provided by central government in the region. In addition, 
fiscal matters are discussed in a multilateral fashion in the 
council on fiscal policy and finance. 
 
Conclusion 
A comparative ‘global’ perspective, as well as a UK-focused 
‘local’ study, strongly suggest that electorally strong and 
radicalising regionalist parties are a major cause for 
decentralisation reforms. European integration is at most an 
intermediating factor as regionalist parties may use ‘Europe’ 
or the ‘European Union’ as a legitimation to further their 
autonomy demands. A dissolving UK is unlikely to happen 
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because a closer look at how the SNP understands 
independence reveals that they would like Scotland to be in a 
monetary, monarchical, and social welfare Union with the 
UK, as well as in a defense and international Union with 
NATO and the EU. The preferences of the SNP and the three 
statewide parties, that is Conservatives, Liberal Democrats 
and Labour, clearly converge on further devolution reforms, 
especially with regard to tax powers and welfare policy. In the 
aftermath of the referendum on Scottish independence this 
is exactly what happened with the adoption of the Scotland 
Act 2016. While it is highly likely that the Union will not 
dissolve, this still leaves open the possibility that the Union 
will become weaker. 
A comparison of Scotland’s autonomy arrangement to those 
of other autonomous regions illustrates that further 
decentralisation is conceivable with regard to shared rule, in 
particular regarding borrowing, executive and fiscal control. 
However, when devolution proceeds in those realms, it could 
actually mean that the Union will be strengthened because it 
would require regular and formal meetings between the 
devolved administrations and the UK governments to arrive 
at binding decisions on national and regional borrowing, UK 
legislation and fiscal transfers from Westminster to the 
regions.  
The Brexit negotiations will involve intense and frequent 
negotiations between the UK government and the EU but will 
also involve the devolved administrations. In practice, the 
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Joint Ministerial Committee on European Affairs is the only 
channel through which Scotland can try to negotiate a 
favourable position for itself after a Brexit. The upshot is that 
shared rule will increase and that the UK is bound to move 
towards a strengthened Union. 
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Endnote 
1. After devolution a memorandum of understanding was 
signed in 1999 to set up a Joint Ministerial Committee which 
entitles the regional governments to consult with the UK 
government on legislation that impinges on them or to 
resolve disputes between regional and UK governments. 
With the exception of the EU affairs committee, the JMC did 
not meet regularly until 2008. However, consultations are 
non-binding and intergovernmental relations mainly take 
place through non-binding and inter-departmental 
concordats and pacts. 
